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Graudenz POW Camp
3rd November 1914 Yarmouth Raid - 3rd Nov 1914 The Raid on Yarmouth, which took place on 3 November 1914, was an attack by the German Navy on the British North Sea port and town of Great Yarmouth. Little damage was done to the town since shells only landed on the beach after German ships laying mines offshore were interrupted by British destroyers. One British submarine was sunk by a mine as it attempted to leave harbour and attack the German ships. One German armoured cruiser was sunk after striking two German mines outside its own home port.
In October 1914, the German Navy was seeking ways to attack the British fleet. The Royal Navy had more ships than Germany, so it was felt inadvisable to enter into any direct fleet to fleet engagement. Instead, the Germans sought ways to attack British ships individually or in small groups. The Kaiser had given orders that no major fleet action was to take place, but small groups of ships might still take part in raids. The raids had several objectives. One was to lay mines which later might sink passing British ships. Another was to pick off any small ships encountered, or to entice larger groups into giving chase and lead them back to where the German High Seas Fleet would be waiting in relatively safe waters near to Germany. A further consideration was that raiding British coastal towns might force the British to alter the disposition of its ships to protect those towns. The British had resolved to keep the greater part of the Grand Fleet together, so it would always have superiority in numbers whenever it engaged the enemy. Germany hoped to make Britain split more ships from the main fleet for coastal defence thus giving Germany more opportunities to catch isolated ships. The Yarmouth raid was carried out by a German battlecruiser squadron commanded by Admiral Franz von Hipper with three battlecruisers (SMS Seydlitz, Von der Tann and Moltke), the slightly smaller armoured cruiser SMS Blücher and the light cruisers SMS Strassburg, Graudenz, Kolberg and Stralsund. On this occasion, mines were to be laid off the coast of Yarmouth and Lowestoft, but the ships were also to shell Yarmouth.
At 1630 on 2 November 1914, the battlecruiser squadron left its home base on the Jade River. Two squadrons of German battleships followed them from harbour slightly later, to lie in wait for any ships which the battlecruisers might be able to entice to chase them back. By midnight, the squadron was sufficiently north to be passing fishing trawlers from various countries. By 0630 on 3 November, the patrol sighted a marker buoy at "Smith's Knoll Watch", allowing them to determine their exact position and close in to Yarmouth. Yarmouth coast was patrolled by the minesweeper HMS Halcyon and the old destroyers HMS Lively and Leopard. Halcyon spotted two cruisers, which she challenged. The response came in the form of shellfire, first small, then from larger calibre guns. Lively, some 2 miles behind, started to make smoke to hide the ships. German shooting was less accurate than it might have been because all the battlecruisers fired upon her at once, making it harder for each ship to tell where their own shells were landing and correct their aim. At 0740, Hipper ceased firing at Lively and instead directed some shells toward Yarmouth, which hit the beach. Once Stralsund had finished laying mines, the ships departed. Halcyon, out of immediate danger, radioed a warning of the presence of German ships. The destroyer HMS Success moved to join Halcyon while three more destroyers in harbour started to raise steam. The submarines HMS E10, D5 and D3, inside the harbour, moved out to join the chase, but D5 struck a newly laid mine and sank. At 0830, Halcyon returned to harbour and provided a report of what had happened. At 0955, Admiral Beatty was ordered south with a British battlecruiser squadron, with squadrons of the Grand Fleet following from Ireland. By then, Hipper was 50 miles away, heading home. German ships returning home waited overnight in Schillig Roads for fog to clear before returning to harbour. In the fog, the armoured cruiser SMS Yorck, which was traveling from the Jade Bay to Wilhelmshaven, went off course and hit two mines. A number of the crew survived by sitting on the wreck of the ship, which had sunk in shallow water, but at least 235 men were killed.
Admiral Hipper was awarded an Iron Cross for the success of the raid, but refused to wear it, feeling little had been accomplished. Although the results were not spectacular, German commanders were heartened by the ease with which Hipper had arrived and departed, with little resistance and were encouraged to try again. In part, the lack of reaction from the British had been due to news received that morning of a much more serious loss at the Battle of Coronel and the fact that Admiral Jellicoe, commander of the Grand Fleet, was on a train returning to his ships at the time of the raid Also, according to First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, the British could not believe there was nothing more to the raid than briefly shelling Yarmouth and were waiting for something else to happen.
Order of Battle
- Royal Navy
- HMS Halcyon, minesweeper, flagship
- HMS Lively, destroyer
- HMS Leopard, destroyer
- HMS Success, destroyer
- HMS E10, submarine
- HMS D5, submarine
- HMS D3, submarine
- German Navy
- SMS Seydlitz, battlecruiser, flagship
- SMS Von der Tann, battlecruiser
- SMS Moltke, battlecruiser
- SMS Blücher, armoured cruiser
- SMS Strassburg, light cruiser
- SMS Graudenz, light cruiser
- SMS Kolberg, light cruiser
- SMS Stralsund, light cruiserJohn Doran
24th January 1915 Battle of Dogger Bank 1915 The First Battle of Dogger Bank was fought in the North Sea on 24 January 1915, between squadrons of the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet. The British, through decoded radio messages had received advance information that a German raiding squadron was heading for Dogger Bank and sent naval forces to intercept it.
They encountered the Germans at the expected location, surprising the smaller and slower German squadron, who fled homewards. Chasing them for several hours, the British slowly closed with the Germans and engaged them with long-range gunfire. The rearmost German ship, the Blücher was badly damaged, but the Germans also put the British flagship HMS Lion out of action with heavy damage. Due to a signalling error, the remaining British ships broke off pursuit of the fleeing enemy force to sink Blücher, as a result of which the German squadron escaped. All the remaining German vessels returned safely to harbour, though some had heavy damage requiring extended repairs.
Lion made it back to port but was out of action for several months. It was hailed as a British victory as no ships were lost and casualties were light, while the Germans lost a ship and most of its crew. Both navies drew lessons from the encounter and both Commanders were replaced on grounds of poor judgement.
Order of battle at Dogger Bank (1915)
- British Forces:
- 1st Battlecruiser Squadron: HMS Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal.
- 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron: HMS New Zealand and Indomitable.
- 1st Light Cruiser Squadron: HMS Southampton, Birmingham, Lowestoft, and Nottingham.
- Harwich Force: three light cruisers (HMS Aurora, Arethusa, Undaunted) and 35 destroyers.
- German Forces:
- 1st Scouting Group: SMS Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger and Blücher.
- 2nd Scouting Group: SMS Kolberg, Stralsund, Rostock, and Graudenz.
- Two flotillas of torpedo boats - 18 in total.
Background to the action
The success at Heligoland Bight had the main German battle fleet effectively bottled up, so the German high command decided a raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby would be made with Admiral Franz Hipper's battlecruiser squadron. This comprised three battlecruisers and one large armoured cruiser—supported by light cruisers and destroyers. Hipper opened fire at 0800 on 16 December 1914, eventually killing 108 civilians and wounding 525. Public and political opinion was outraged that German warships could sail so close to the British coast, shelling coastal towns with apparent impunity. British naval forces had failed to prevent the attacks, and also failed to intercept Hipper's raiding squadron afterwards. Though the British fleet was at sea hunting Hipper after the raid, the Germans escaped in stormy weather, aided by low visibility and British communication problems.
Buoyed by the success of the raid, Admiral Hipper resolved to repeat the exercise by attacking the British fishing fleet on the Dogger Bank — midway between Germany and Britain — the following month. Hipper suspected that the British fishing fleet was providing intelligence on German fleet movements.
Through intercepted German radio traffic decoded by Room 40 of British Naval Intelligence, the British learned of Hipper's planned sortie on 23 January 1915. Acting Vice Admiral Beatty set sail from Rosyth with five battlecruisers — supported by four light cruisers — to attempt to trap Hipper's force. They were joined by additional cruisers and destroyers from Harwich as Beatty headed south, encountering Hipper's screening vessels at the Dogger Bank at 0705 on 24 January. The day was clear and visibility was unusually good.
Sighting the smoke from a large approaching force, Hipper headed southeast by 0735 to escape, but Beatty's ships were faster than the German squadron, which was held back by the slower armoured cruiser SMS Blücher and by Hipper's coal-fired torpedo boats. By 0800, Hipper's battlecruisers were sighted from Beatty's flagship, HMS Lion. The older battlecruisers of the British 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron lagged somewhat behind the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron. Chasing the Germans from a position astern and to starboard of Hipper's force, the British ships gradually caught up — some reaching speeds of 27 kn (31 mph; 50 km/h) — and closed to gun range. Beatty chose to approach from this direction because the prevailing wind then blew the British ships' smoke clear, allowing them a good view of the enemy, while Hipper's gunners were partially blinded by funnel and gun smoke blowing in the direction of their targets. Lion opened fire at 0852 at a range of 20,000 yd (18,000 m). Other British ships opened as they came within range, while the Germans were unable to reply until 0911 because of the shorter range of their guns. No warships had ever before engaged at such long ranges or at such high speeds and gunnery challenges for both sides were therefore unprecedented. Nevertheless, after a few salvos the British shells had straddled Blücher.
The British fire was concentrated on two of the German ships, Hipper's flagship battlecruiser SMS Seydlitz at the head of the line and Blücher at the rear. With five British ships to the German four, Beatty intended that his two rear ships, HMS New Zealand and Indomitable, should engage Blücher, while his leading three engaged their opposite numbers. But Captain H.B. Pelly of the newly commissioned battlecruiser HMS Tiger assumed that two ships should concentrate on the leading German ship and engaged Seydlitz, leaving SMS Moltke unmolested to fire at Lion. Worse, Tiger's fire was ineffective, as she mistook Lion's shell splashes for her own (when her shots were actually falling 3,000 yd (2,700 m) beyond Seydlitz).
At 0943, Seydlitz was hit by a 13.5 in (340 mm) shell from Lion, which penetrated her after turret barbette and caused an ammunition fire in the working chamber. This fire spread rapidly through one compartment after another, igniting ready propellant charges all the way to the magazines, and knocked out both rear turrets with the loss of 165 men. Only the prompt action of the executive officer in flooding the magazines, saved Seydlitz from a massive magazine explosion that would have destroyed the ship.
The British ships were relatively unscathed until 1018, when SMS Derfflinger hit Lion with several 12 inches (305 mm) shells, damaging her engines and causing flooding so that Lion began to lag behind. At 1041, Lion narrowly escaped a disaster similar to what had happened on Seydlitz, when a German shell hit the forward turret and ignited a small ammunition fire which, fortunately for the British, was extinguished before it caused catastrophe. A few minutes later, taking on water and listing to port, Lion had to stop her port engine and reduce speed to 15 kn (17 mph; 28 km/h), and was soon out of action, having been hit 14 times.
Meanwhile, at 1030, Blücher was hit by a shell from HMS Princess Royal, which caused an ammunition fire and boiler room damage. As a result, Blücher had to reduce speed to 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h), and fell further and further behind the rest of the German force. Beatty ordered Indomitable — his slowest ship — to intercept Blücher.
Now Hipper, running low on ammunition, made the difficult decision to leave the disabled Blücher to her fate and steam for home, in order to save his remaining damaged ships. Nevertheless, the annihilation of the German squadron still appeared likely to the pursuing British until 1054, when Beatty — believing he saw a submarine's periscope on Lion's starboard bow — ordered a sharp, 90° turn to port to avoid a submarine trap. (It is possible that the "periscope" was actually a surfacing, run-out torpedo which had been launched 15 minutes earlier by the German destroyer V5). At 1102, realising that so sharp a turn would open the range too much, Beatty ordered "Course NE" to limit the turn to 45°, and then added "Engage the enemy's rear", in an attempt to clarify his intention that his other ships, which had now left Lion far behind, should pursue Hipper's main force. With Lion's electric generators now out of commission, Beatty could only signal using flag hoists, and both these signals were flown at the same time. But the combination of the signal of "Course NE" — which happened to be the direction of Blücher — and the signal to engage the rear was misunderstood by Beatty’s second-in-command — Rear-Admiral Gordon Moore on New Zealand — as an order for all the battlecruisers to finish off the cripple. Therefore, the remaining British battlecruisers broke off the pursuit of the fleeing German squadron and rounded on Blücher. Most of the British light cruisers and destroyers also attacked Blücher. Beatty tried to correct this obvious misunderstanding by using Horatio Nelson's famous order from Trafalgar "Engage the enemy more closely", but this order was not in the signal book, so he chose "Keep nearer to the enemy" as the closest equivalent. But by the time this signal was hoisted, Moore's ships were too far away to read Beatty's flags, and the correction was not received.
Despite the overwhelming odds, Blücher fought stubbornly to the end. Blücher managed to put the British destroyer HMS Meteor out of action and scored two hits on the British battlecruisers with her 8.2 in (210 mm) guns, but was pounded into a burning wreck by approximately 50 British shells. Finally, struck by two torpedoes from the light cruiser HMS Arethusa, Blücher capsized and sank at 1313 with the loss of 792 men. British efforts to rescue survivors in the water were interrupted by the arrival of the German Zeppelin L-5 (aka LZ-28), and by a German seaplane which attacked with small bombs. No damage was done, but the British ships — which were sitting targets while stopped in the water for rescue — put on speed and withdrew to avoid further aerial attack.
By this time, Hipper had escaped; his ships were now too far away for the British to catch them again. Beatty had lost control of the battle, and he perceived that the opportunity of an overwhelming victory had been lost. The Admiralty — incorrectly believing that Derfflinger had been badly damaged — would soon reach the same conclusion. However, in light of what happened later at Jutland, where the British battlecruisers were shown to be highly vulnerable to ammunition fires and magazine explosions following hits on gun turrets, it is possible that if Moore's three fast battlecruisers had pursued Hipper's remaining three (leaving the slower Indomitable behind as Beatty intended), the British might actually have been at a disadvantage and might have got the worst of it. Blücher demonstrated the ability of the German ships to absorb great punishment. All of Hipper's remaining ships were larger, faster, more modern, more heavily armed, and far better armoured than Blücher and only Seydlitz had suffered any serious damage. Apart from the sinking of Blücher, the Germans out-hit the British by over three to one, with 22 heavy-calibre hits — 16 on Lion and six on Tiger — against the British total of just seven hits.
Aftermath of the Battle
Lion had to be towed back to port by Indomitable at 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h), a long and dangerous voyage in which both battlecruisers were exposed to potential submarine attacks. Therefore, an enormous screen of over fifty ships was assigned to guard Lion and Indomitable as they crept home. Both reached port safely. The disabled Meteor was also towed home. Lion was out of action for four months, Lord Fisher having decreed that her damage be repaired on the Tyne without going into dry dock, making for an extremely difficult and time-consuming job.
All the surviving German ships reached port, though Seydlitz was heavily damaged and had to go into drydock for repairs. Although the Germans initially believed that Tiger had been sunk because of a large fire that had been seen on her decks, it was soon clear that the battle was a serious reverse. A furious Kaiser Wilhelm II issued an order that all further risks to surface vessels were to be avoided. Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl—commander of the High Seas Fleet—was replaced by Admiral Hugo von Pohl. The Germans took the lessons of the battle to heart, particularly the damage to Seydlitz, which revealed flaws in the protection of her magazines and dangerous ammunition-handling procedures.Some of these issues were corrected in Germany's battleships and battlecruisers in time for the Battle of Jutland the following summer. Although the Germans realized that the appearance of the British squadron at dawn was too remarkable to be mere coincidence, they concluded that an enemy agent near their base in the Jade Bay was responsible, and did not suspect that their wireless codes had been compromised.
Although the battle was not greatly consequential in itself, it boosted British morale. But while the Germans learned their lessons, the British did not. The unfortunate Rear-Admiral Moore was quietly replaced, but Beatty's flag lieutenant Ralph Seymour — responsible for hoisting Beatty's two commands on one flag hoist, thereby allowing them to be read as one — remained. Signalling on board Lion would again be poor in the first hours of Jutland, with serious consequences for the British. Nor did the battlecruisers learn their lesson about fire distribution, as similar targeting errors were made at Jutland.John Doran
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Capt. G. D. J. McMurtie 6th Btn. Somerset Light InfantryCaptain McMurtie was a prisoner at Graudenz POW Camp.
Capt. Matthews Worcester Rgt.Captain Matthews was a prisoner at Graudenz POW camp.
Capt. Walter L. Clinton 1st Btn. attchd. 2nd Btn. King's Royal Rifle CorpsCaptain Clinton was a prisoner at Graudenz POW camp. He escaped on 4th October 1918 and walked 190 miles to freedom. Sadly, he died in Belgrade on 22nd November 1918 and is buried in Belgrade New Cemetery, Grave 179.
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